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Abstract 
 
In this paper I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has 
provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this 
imbalance. In contrast to the historical literature a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles 
played by theory, model and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to discuss not 
only Crick and Watson’s well-known model and Franklin’s x-ray diffraction pictures (the evidence) but also the 
less well-known theory of helical diffraction, which was absolutely crucial to Crick and Watson’s discovery. The 
insights into this ground-breaking historical episode will have consequences for the “new” received view of 
scientific models and their function and relationship to theory and world. The received view, dominated by 
works by Nancy Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison (1999), rather than trying to put forth a “theory of 
models”, is interested in questions to do with (i) the function of models in scientific practice and (ii) the 
construction of models. In regard to (i), the received view locates the model (as an idealized, simplified version 
of the real system under investigation) between theory and the world and sees the model as allowing the 
application of the former to the latter. As to (ii) Cartwright has argued for a phenomenologically-driven view and 
Morgan and Morrison (1999) for the “autonomy” of models in the construction process: models are neither 
determined by theory nor by the world. The present case study of the discovery of the DNA structure strongly 
challenges both (i) and (ii). In contrast to claim (i) of the received view, it was not Crick and Watson’s model but 
rather the helical diffraction theory, which served a mediating purpose between the model and the x-ray 
diffraction pictures. In particular Cartwright’s take on (ii) is refuted by comparing Franklin’s bottom-up 
approach with Crick and Watson’s top-down approach in constructing the model. The former led to difficulties, 
which only a strong confidence in the structure incorporated in the model could circumvent.  
 
Keywords: DNA structure, model-building, phenomenologically-driven view, models as mediators, Inference to 
the Best Explanation.  
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It is also a good rule not to put too much confidence in the observational 
results that are put forward until they are confirmed by theory.  
(Sir Arthur Eddington 1934, New Pathways in Science, 211) 
 
 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The discovery of the DNA structure has been the subject of two big historical volumes (Olby 
1994, Judson 1996), numerous memoirs, biographies and anniversary articles1. One might say 
that not many episodes in the history of science have been covered as well as this discovery. 
Thus, 
 
[i]t appears that everything that could be said about [the discovery of the DNA] has been said, that there is no 
unknown element that could falsify this or that aspect of the story, or at the very least provide a new an original 
point of view. (Morange 1998, 111) 
 
In spite of the rich resources provided by the historians, rather oddly, the discovery of DNA 
has not found entry into philosophical debates. It is the aim of this paper to remove this “blind 
spot” of the philosophy of science by making available well-chosen aspects of the history and 
presenting them in a form, which offers more appeal to the theoretically interested reader than 
mere historical narratives and descriptions, which are at best entertaining but contain rather 
little insight.   
On the very few occasions philosophers of science do refer to the discovery of the 
DNA structure their analysis concentrates on the physical nature and the representive function 
of the model Crick and Watson constructed of the DNA structure2. I, however, regard the 
physical nature of the model peripheral and rather untelling in philosophical terms3. Instead, 
in this essay I am going to discuss Crick and Watson’s DNA model in terms of contemporary 
accounts of the relationship between the model, theory and the world. 
In recent discussions about models the focus has shifted away from early attempts to 
characterize and classify models with a strong emphasis on metaphors and analogies (Black 
1962, Hesse 1966, Achinstein 1968) and later efforts to define scientific models formally 
(Suppes 1960, van Fraassen 1980) towards (i) the function models fulfil in scientific practice 
and (ii) how they are constructed4. Considerable responsibility for having brought about the 
latter shift belongs to Cartwright (1983), Cartwright et al. (1995) and Morgan and Morrison 
                                                 
1  Franklin has been portrayed by Sayre (1975) and Maddox (2002). Of course, some biographies and memoirs 
are less valuable than others. Sayre’s book is a rather angry attempt to defend Franklin against an apparently 
women-hostile, male-dominated science and not very valuable for the purposes of my paper. The highly praised 
memoir by Watson in my opinion, too, belongs into the less valuable category. Although Crick’s furious 
assessment of Watson’s memoir after his first reading is harsh I do feel sympathetic to it: “Should you persist in 
regarding your book as history I should add that it shows such a naïve and egoistical view of the subject as to be 
scarcely credible. Anything with any intellectual content, including matters which were of central importance to 
us at the time, is skipped over or omitted. Your view of history is that found in the lower class of women’s 
magazines.” (Crick in Judson 1996, 157) I certainly think it is a gross misunderstanding to interpret Watson’s 
memoir “as it really was” (Merton 1968; in Watson 1980, 213). 
2 See, for instance, Giere (2002) and Frigg and Hartmann (2006). Usually, the philosophers’ analysis does not 
go beyond merely mentioning the physical character of Crick and Watson’s model. 
3 That the physical nature of Crick and Watson’s model cannot be as important as philosophers of science have 
believed (without having even attempted to gain a deeper understanding of the model) is apparent from the fact 
that nowadays the same task is done exclusively with computer models.  
4 See Schindler (2006) for a contrast between the formalist and the “methodological” approach for describing 
the semantic view and Cartwright’s and Morgan and Morrison’s view on models respectively. See also Bailer-
Jones (1999) for a rather biased narrative on the development of the philosophical treatment of scientific models.  
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(1999). These philosophers of science, to a large extent, have given up finding a proper 
definition of scientific models: 
 
Although we want to argue for some general claims about models – their autonomy and role as mediating 
instruments, we do not see ourselves as providing a ‘theory’ of models. The latter would provide well-defined 
criteria for identifying something as a model […]. (Morgan and Morrison 1999, 12)  
 
Although one is confronted with the reluctance to define models and with a particular 
reluctance to define models in formal terms (as the proponents of the semantic view prefer 
to), often it is implicitly assumed that models are “simplifications”, “idealizations”, or 
“distortions” of the real system, which is clear from the following quote by Cartwright:  
 
I think that a model – a specially prepared, usually fictional description of the [real] system under study – is 
employed whenever a mathematical theory is applied to reality and I use the word ‘model’ deliberately to 
suggest the failure of exact correspondence [with reality] which simulacra [i.e. models] share with both Hesse’s 
analogical models and with Redhead and Cushing’s theoretical models (Cartwright 1983, 158p.) 
 
That is, for Cartwright a model is a fictitious entity (she also refers to it as “simulacrum”, or 
the “prepared description”), which distorts reality in order to allow the application of the 
theory to reality. The theory is only true of the objects in the model, not of real ones (ibid., 
17). In other words, the model renders reality palatable to the theory, although the model itself 
is constructed without the use of theory:  
 
[W]e present the phenomenon in a way that will bring it into the theory. The most apparent need is to write down 
a description to which the theory matches an equation […] This first stage of theory entry is informal. There may 
be better and worse attempts, and a good deal of practical wisdom helps, but no principles of the theory tell us 
how we are to prepare the description. (Cartwright 1983, 133p.; my italics) 
 
More recently, Cartwright, with others, (Cartwright et al. 1995) has emphasised precisely this 
“bottom-up” construction of models independently of theory5: 
 
What is needed is the recognition of the independence from theory, in methods and aims, of the scientific 
activity we have come to call phenomenological model building. (Cartwright et al. 1995, 148) Instead of a 
theory-driven view of models, we suggest a phenomenologically-driven one. (ibid., 137) 
 
However Cartwright et al.’s blunt claim that model building proceeds independently of theory 
“in methods and aims” is slightly weakened by Cartwright et al. in the same paper where they 
concede that “[t]heory plays its own small important role [in the construction of models]. But 
it is a tool like any other; and you can not build a house with a hammer alone.” (140) Still, 
Cartwright utterly rejects deduction from theory to models as playing any part in this 
construction process: 
 
Another kind of argument depends on looking at how we arrive at models in physics – not by deduction from 
basic theory it turns out. (140) 
 
The same goes for the relation between theory and reality.  
 
But treatments of real systems are not deductive; nor are they approximately deductive, nor deductive with 
correction, nor plausibly approaching closer to deductivity as our theories progress. (Cartwright 1999a, 9) 
 
                                                 
5 French and Ladyman (1997) have criticised this view by reconsidering Cartwright et al.’s case study of 
London and London’s model of superconductivity in pitiless detail and came to the conclusion that Cartwright et 
al.’s analysis of the case was rather superficial and does not support their conclusions – in particular in regard to 
phenomenological model building. 
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Thus in conclusion, according to Cartwright, models are fictitious entities, which allow the 
application of the theory to the world (their function) and they are built from the bottom-up 
from the phenomena without the use of any deductions from theory (their construction). Let 
us now consider the “models as mediators” view as characterized by Suarez in Models as 
Mediators edited by Morgan and Morrison (1999): 
 
Mediating models always stand between theory and the physical world. Their main function is to enable us to 
apply scientific theory to natural phenomena […] Morrison has identified three main features. First mediating 
models are not derivable from theory […] Secondly, these models are not necessitated by the empirical data 
either […] Finally mediating models have a very significant property: they can replace the physical systems as 
the central objects of scientific inquiry. (Suarez 1999, 168) 
 
Again, like Cartwright, the proponents of the “models as mediators view” claim, and 
emphasise more strongly than Cartwright, that the model allows the application of the theory 
to the world. The model is explicitly located “between” theory and the world. However, as 
regards the construction of the model, it is neither determined by theory (“top-down”) nor by 
data (“bottom-up”). The model is “autonomous”. At this instance it is interesting to note that 
also the semantic view (the predominant formalist account of models), which often serves as 
the target of attack for Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison, not only locates the model 
between theory and the world (see Giere 1988, 83 for a pictorial illustration of this) but also 
allocates the same function to models as Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison. According to 
Morrison “[…] the semantic view suggests that we need models where we want to fit the 
theory to concrete situations” (1999, 42)6.  
 In this essay I shall show that the discovery of the DNA structure challenges the 
received view of models in regard to the nature and the construction of models and in regard 
to the function they fulfil. First, I want to question the appropriateness of the theory – model – 
world trichotomy and the model’s function of allowing the application of theory to the world, 
about which philosophers of science do not seem to have any disagreement. It will be shown 
that the discovery of the DNA saw the theory “mediating” between the model and the world. 
It must be stressed that this is different from Weisberg’s very recent account of Abstract 
Direct Representation (ADR) (Weisberg forthcoming)7. ADR, according to Weisberg, is the 
representation of phenomena “without the mediation of a model” (ibid., 4). Although this 
seems to be one of the claims I will argue for in this paper, Weisberg’s claim is different from 
mine. Before we can see why this is so, we have to understand how Weisberg differentiates 
between “modelling” and ADR.     
 
… the most distinctive characteristic of the practice of modeling is the analysis of a real world phenomenon by 
first analyzing a model. Hence the process of representing a model becomes the first step in representing a real 
world phenomenon. This is distinct from ADR because, in ADR, there is no intermediary stage. Theorists 
engaged in ADR analyze and represent the properties of a real world phenomenon, suitably abstracted, in the 
first instance. Their aim is to represent a real phenomenon and analyze their representation of this phenomenon. 
(ibid., 17) 
 
                                                 
6 Patrick Suppes, one of the founders of the semantic view, conjectured that there were many different sorts of 
models: data models, models of phenomena and theoretical models. However the fact remains that he too located 
those models between the theory and the world.  
7 Godfrey-Smith (2006) not only draws on Weisberg but seems to have been involved in developing ADR. I 
would like to thank one of the referee’s of this paper for drawing my attention to Weisberg’s and Godfrey-
Smith’s accounts.  
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Whereas in modelling one “starts with” the model (by abstracting and idealizing from the 
phenomena), analyses this model and then “coordinates the model with the phenomena”8, in 
ADR one abstracts from the phenomena in order to construct a “representation” of the real 
phenomena, without first constructing an idealization or simplification of the real 
phenomenon. Whereas modelling, according to Weisberg, is an indirect form of theorizing, 
ADR is a direct form. There are many problems with Weisberg’s account. First of all, it does 
not seem to be entirely clear, if there is really any difference between a model and a 
representation in ADR. Both, Weisberg admits, are abstractions of the real phenomena. If 
there is no difference between the two, modelling and ADR collapse into one account9. More 
importantly, it is not immediately clear what the difference is supposed to be between ADR 
and classical hypothesis construction. Confronted with a phenomenon, one constructs a 
hypothesis, which is to explain the phenomena in question, of course, without the mediation 
of a model.10 But all these difficulties aside, I’m making a very different claim from 
Weisberg. I am not saying that there was no model involved in the discovery of the DNA 
structure – which would be foolish anyway – but rather that the order of the standard theory-
model-evidence trichotomy has to be altered in order to account for the historical episode in 
question.  
 The second challenge I want to put forth against the received view of models concerns 
the construction and the nature of models as idealizations or simplifications of the real system 
under consideration. It is hard to see in what sense Crick and Watson’s model is to be 
considered a simplification or idealization of the real structure of DNA. After all, before Crick 
and Watson discovered the structure of DNA, no one knew how the real structure looked like. 
So how could they have possibly simplified this real structure in a model?11 Now, one might 
want to say instead that the DNA structure was inferred from the evidence. The only 
inference from the evidence towards a hypothesis philosophers of science have come up with 
hitherto is the inference to the best explanation (IBE). IBE usually is held by scientific realists 
but rejected by anti-realists, most notably by Bas van Fraassen. IBE is the claim that the 
scientist starts with a set of data and from them infers the truth of the hypothesis which can 
account for the data best:  
 
In making this inference one infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the evidence, to the 
truth of that hypothesis. In general, there will be several hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so one 
must be able to reject all such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making the inference. (Harman 
1965, 89) 
 
Okasha (2000) has pointed out that although van Fraassen has attacked IBE on the basis of the 
assumption that IBE is meant to operate in the context of justification, IBE actually is meant 
to be applicable to the context of discovery too. That is, rather than being used as just some 
sort of selection procedure for choosing between various hypotheses already in place given a 
particular set of evidence, IBE also is to be taken as a method for generating hypotheses, 
which can then be compared and selected for the best: 
                                                 
8 Weisberg is very obscure on what he calls the “coordination with phenomena”. He merely alludes to some 
form of Giereian similarity relationship between the model and the world, but does not even say how this is 
supposed to be achieved. 
9 Weisberg does reserve idealizations to model building, however, he is not clear enough on for them to be a 
proper distinguishing feature idealizations (he only says that idealizations lower “one’s standards of fidelity; 
Weisberg forthcoming, 25). 
10 This seems to be particularly the case for the Darwin’s “theory” of atoll formation, which is one of exactly 
two examples Weisberg quotes in support of his ADR account. The other example is Mendeleev’s table, which 
many people would not even be happy to call a theory. This includes even Mendeleev himself: “I shall not form 
any hypotheses, either here or further on, to explain the nature of the periodic law”. (Mendeleev, 1879, p. 292) 
11 One might even want to say that it is the physical model which is to be considered as a simplification of the 
real structure. Yet, the irrelevance of the physical nature of Crick and Watson’s model was pointed out above.   
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Given a puzzling phenomenon, we construct a number of hypotheses to try to explain it, and choose the one we 
think explains the phenomenon best. Looked at this way, IBE is not simply a way of selecting between already 
existing hypotheses, as per van Fraassen, but also a way of generating the hypotheses on which the selection 
procedure operates. (Okasha 2000, 695)12  
 
The generation of hypotheses by Saunders Peirce was even characterised as the fundamental 
feature of abduction (the precursor of IBE) distinguishing it from deduction and induction: 
 
Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces 
any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value [?], and deduction merely evolves the necessary 
consequences of a pure hypothesis. (Peirce xxx, 5.171; my emphasis) 
 
So, one needs not commit to scientific realism in order to be sympathetic to IBE as a form of 
discovery procedure. Therefore, although Cartwright has followed van Fraassen in rejecting 
IBE as an inference to the true explanation (see Cartwright 1983), I take it that she, through 
her phenomenologically-driven view on the construction of models, is committed to IBE as a 
construction procedure. Although Cartwright has remarked that she has “no quarrel with 
induction as a form of inference” (Cartwright 1999a, 12), induction is not the appropriate 
form of inference in the discovery of the DNA. In induction one reasons from particulars to 
universals. And yet, in the case of the superconductor, with which Cartwright et al. have 
developed their notion of the phenomenologically-driven view, as well as in the case of the 
discovery of the DNA structure, which is going to be discussed in this paper, induction does 
not seem to be the appropriate form of reasoning. Rather than generalizing over a large 
number of phenomena only very few phenomena (the Meissner effect in the case of 
superconductivity and particular x-ray patterns in the case of the discovery of the DNA 
structure) seem to be crucial for the construction of the respective models in two cases in 
question. That is, both the DNA model and the model of superconductivity are not the result 
of empirical generalizations but seem to be rather the result of very specific conjectures about 
a particular real system. And it was exactly this sort of inference which Rosalind Franklin was 
using in her attempt to reveal the structure of DNA. Franklin conducted experiments and on 
the basis of the obtained evidence she tried to infer the structure that would fit her data best. 
All the hypotheses she was considering, she subjected to the evidence and was happy to reject 
a hypothesis, if it did not “fit the data”. Furthermore, the hypotheses she was taken into 
account had to fit all the data available. On the other hand, Crick and Watson chose a very 
different path. They did not start with the x-ray photographs, the only direct evidence of the 
structure available, but rather, as is well known, built models on the basis of the known bond 
angles and distances of the component parts of the DNA. In contrast to Franklin, who was 
considering every hypothesis she could think of, Crick and Watson stuck to one structural 
hypothesis throughout. There was not a single moment when they doubted that the DNA 
structure would be helical and did not allow any evidence to refute this hypothesis. They 
simply ignored the evidence, which others took as a straightforward refutation of the helical 
hypothesis. Crick and Watson did not construct their model from the bottom-up, as 
Cartwright et al. have claimed for the case of superconductivity (which they hold to be a most 
representative case). Rather, “top-down” deductions derived from a supposed helical structure 
– contrary to Cartwright’s outright rejection of the importance of deductions in scientific 
practice (cf. p. 3) – played a most crucial part in the discovery of the DNA structure13. I 
consider Crick and Watson’s approach, which led to the ultimate solution of the DNA 
structure, to be highly problematic in particular for Cartwright’s phenomenologically-driven 
                                                 
12 For the same point see also Lipton (2004, 67). 
13 See also Schindler (2007) for the claim the phenomena of the zebra pattern that kicked off the plate tectonic 
revolution was constructed from “top-down” rather than from the “bottom-up”. 
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view and furthermore for those philosophers of science, who take abduction and IBE to be 
necessary and sufficient forms of discovery procedures.   
 In the first section of this paper I will introduce the two principal methods of how to 
get to the structure of macromolecules in general and the structure of DNA in particular. We 
shall see that Franklin used a rather “direct” method starting from the x-ray diffraction 
pictures, the only direct evidence of the macrostructure. The reader will be made briefly 
familiar with x-ray crystallography, the technique used to study the structure of crystals and 
crystallisable material like DNA. The other principal method of “how to get to the structure” 
involves model building. Hypothetical structures are sought to be assembled coherently from 
the smaller components of the macromolecule. This was the method used by Pauling, who 
was followed by Crick and Watson, who admired Pauling’s “panache” in model building and 
despised Franklin’s direct approach. We shall see that Pauling’s reported panache in 
discovering the structure of proteins had to do with his preparedness to disregard x-ray 
diffraction evidence, which others took very seriously. In Section 2 we shall encounter the 
consequences, which were derived from Pauling’s protein model, and among them, the 
consequences predicted by the helical diffraction theory, developed by Crick, Cochran and 
Vand (CCV), which were to play a pivotal part in the discovery of the DNA structure. The 
role of the CCV theory, in particular, has been denied the attention it deserves. In Section 3 
we shall consider the reasons why Franklin rejected the helical structure to be viable for the 
structure of DNA and how she was able to convince her colleagues Wilkins and Stokes of 
this. In Section 4 I will review the philosophical argument being made throughout this paper 
and the historical evidence presented in its support.  
1. HOW TO GET TO THE STRUCTURE 
At the time of the discovery of the structure of DNA (1950s) there were two distinct ways to 
get to the structure of macromolecules. One was to work out the structure from the only direct 
evidence of the macrostructure available, namely from x-ray diffraction pictures. The other 
method included model building, where the bond angles and distances of the smaller 
components of the macromolecule were tried to be fit into a coherent whole14. Whereas 
Franklin chose the former approach “from the bottom up”, as it were, Crick and Watson chose 
the opposite approach from the top-down from the structure towards the evidence. Let me 
describe Franklin’s method in the next section before going on to Crick and Watson’s.    
1.1 X-RAY DIFFRACTION AND ITS SYNTHESIS 
By means of x-ray diffraction one can determine the positions of atoms in a crystal lattice15. 
The x-rays, whose wavelength is of the same order of magnitude as the spacing between the 
atoms in a molecule, are diffracted by the electrons and leave spots of varying intensity on a 
photographic plate. The photographs obtained from x-ray diffraction are not like ordinary 
photographs due to the impossibility of refracting x-rays. The information contained in the 
photograph gives only half of the information necessary for the knowledge of the structure of 
the investigated molecule: the intensities of the reflected16 x-rays but not their phases. Yet, 
                                                 
14 Although other methods like … have been added since, even nowadays x-ray diffraction and computer-aided 
model-building are the two main means of figuring out the structure of macromolecules.  
15 “A lattice is a geometrical abstraction of the arrangement of any regularly repeating system, which could be a 
protein crystal, or wallpaper […] The repeating section is known as the unit cell of the structure.” (Holmes and 
Blow 1980, 124; italics added) 
16 Due to Bragg X-ray diffraction can be treated as reflection from parallel imaginary “mirror” planes in the 
molecule in the crystalline state. Only x-rays with certain angles of incident are reflected (determined by Bragg’s 
law). Bragg’s idea of the “mirror” planes and the law derived from this idea laid the basis for x-ray 
crystallography (cf. Cracknell 1969). With the help of the Bragg equation nλ = 2d sin (θ) derivable from the 
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both the amplitudes (calculated from the observed intensities) and the phases are necessary for 
performing a Fourier synthesis 
(with the amplitudes figuring as 
coefficients of the Fourier 
series17) which is a means to 
“focus the x-ray 
mathematically” (cf. Taylor 
1967) and thus calculate and 
depict on a contour map the 
electron density of the 
specimen. In some cases the 
phases can be guessed (from 
the symmetry of the crystal) 
and in other cases one can infer 
the phases with the heavy atom 
method or the method of isomorphous replacement18. Those methods, however, cannot be 
applied to long-chain polymers like the DNA (cf. Olby 1996, 38p). Nevertheless, one can 
circumvent the phase problem by using the so-called Patterson synthesis. The Patterson 
synthesis is a Fourier series with intensities instead of amplitudes as coefficients. Since the 
phases do not enter the Patterson synthesis so the Patterson map only shows the interatomic 
distances but not the absolute atomic positions (Fig. 1), which results in N(N-1) peaks (not 
including the central peak and any overlap) relative to the peaks to be observed in a Fourier 
contour map19. It was the Patterson function with which Franklin tried to determine the 
structure of the DNA. Franklin’s only collaborator at King’s college, the PhD student 
Gosling, has expressed Franklin’s attitude towards the structure of the DNA thus:    
 
And I felt repeatedly that [Franklin’s colleague at King’s college] Maurice [Wilkins] was trying various ways to 
stimulate Rosalind into saying something about the structure, but she for her part would say, ‘We are not going 
to speculate, we are going to wait, we are going to let the spots on this photograph [via the Patterson] tell us 
what the structure is.’ (Gosling in Judson 1996, 127; italics added)  
 
Crick and Watson were critical about Franklin’s approach: 
 
Pauling’s paper [on the structure of proteins; see below] is at least in the proper mood and the type of approach 
which the people at Kings College London should be taking instead of being pure crystallographers. (Watson to 
Delbrück, 20 February 1953, in Judson 1996, 146) Everything she did was sound enough – almost too sound. 
She lacked Pauling’s panache. (Crick 1989, 69) 
1.2 MODEL BUILDING AND PAULING’S PANACHE  
In 1950 Pauling, together with Robert Corey and Branson (henceforth PCB), discovered the 
structure of protein molecules20. However, Pauling did not use the method from the “bottom-
                                                                                                                                                        
Bragg model one can calculate the interatomic distances, which used to be measured in Angstrom units (Ǻ), 
whereby 1 Ǻ = 10-1 nm. Instead of Angstrom units nowadays nanometre is the standard unit. I shall stick to the 
Angstrom units throughout this essay for it used in the literature I’m referring to.  
17 Fourier series can represent “any physical event that repeats at regular intervals” and reduce it to a “set of 
simple wave forms, with equivalently simple mathematical statement” (Judson 1996, 516).  
18 Cf. Kendrew and Perutz (1949) and Crick and Kendrew (1957). 
19 For details on the Fourier and Patterson syntheses see Patterson (1934), and the easily accessible Taylor 
(1967), Holmes and Blow (1980) and in particular Kendrew and Perutz (1949). 
20 Pauling and Corey published a letter announcing the discovery a year before their paper (cf. Pauling and 
Corey 1950, Journal of the American Chemical Society, 72, 5349). 
 
Fig. 1 Patterson map (right) of a simple triangular structure (left). The 
letter pairs in the Patterson map correspond to the respective interatomic 
distances in the original structure. Notice that, although the Patterson 
contains information about the interatomic distances, the positional 
information is entirely removed in the Patterson map: all vectors relate to 
the origin.  
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up” described in the last section. Instead he used model building. Wilkins describes PCB’s 
approach thus: 
 
Pauling had a two-pronged approach to the problem [to work out the structure of protein molecules], which 
involved thinking about the much smaller and simpler components of these enormous molecules, and then 
building models of them. […] He used his quantum mechanical theory of chemical bonding and the latest highly 
accurate data on bond lengths and angles to determine what these relative positions might be […] Pauling built 
three-dimensional models of possible structures, to see how the different components might fit together into a 
physically and chemically stable molecule. (Wilkins 2003, 158p.) 
 
That is, on the basis of stereochemical data, Pauling determined the molecule’s structure 
starting from the components towards the whole structure. Bond angles and lengths set the 
constraints, which the three-dimensional scale model of the molecule had to satisfy.  
The historian Horace Judson suitably characterizes Pauling’s 
models as “open three-dimensional puzzles in which the 
individual pieces to be fitted together already carried many of the 
limitations of angles, lengths, and sizes” (Judson 1996, 62). Bond 
angles, distances, and kind (single or double), were set. The 
puzzle solving occurred on the single bonds: 
 
All the bond distances were known and all the bond angles. However, there 
can be fairly free rotation about bonds called single bonds (but not, by contrast, 
about double bonds), and the exact configuration of the atoms in space depends 
on just how these angles of rotation are fixed.(Crick 1989, 55; my italics) The 
problem is rather like a three-dimensional jig saw puzzle with curious pieces 
joined together by rotatable joints (Crick 1954a, 57).21 
 
Notice that in this quote Crick does not even mention the only 
direct evidence of the structure of the molecules available22, 
which figured only at the periphery of Crick and Watson’s model 
building but was so central to Franklin’s approach: X-ray data. 
Franklin, who wanted to work out the structure of the molecule 
from the x-ray data, wasn’t prepared to pursue model building. 
Models, for her, had a very low epistemic value: 
 
Rosalind saw [Bruce Fraser’s three-stranded model], and her view was what she felt about all models: ‘That’s 
very nice – how are you going to prove it is the solution?’ (Maddox 2002, 162) As Rosalind reasoned: ‘How will 
a model show which structure is right? The Patterson will tell us the structure.’ (Gosling cited by Maddox 2002, 
184; original emphasis) 
 
All that mattered to Franklin were x-ray data which were the only direct, though complicated, 
link to the structure of the molecule. Rather than using the model as a means of discovery, 
Franklin thought that models were the end-products of x-ray data analysis:  
 
I encouraged Bruce Fraser, in our lab, to try out his ideas in a model. Rosalind dismissed our excitement [about 
model-building] by saying that model-building is what you do after you have found the structure. (Wilkins 2003, 
160; my emphasis)23 
 
                                                 
21 In his (1989), Crick compares this problem with a flat hand with the thumb at right angles with the index 
finger. One can move the thumb without altering its distance or angle relative to the other fingers of the hand.  
22 “The way to get on, in [Crick’s] opinion, was to reject any argument which did not arise from the chemistry of 
nucleic- acid chains.” (Watson 1980, 101) 
23 See also Maddox (2002, 161). 
 
Fig. 2 PCB’s alpha helix 
including bond angles and 
distances. To be discussed in 
the next section. 
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Crick and Watson adopted the opposite approach. For them – like for Pauling – building 
models and solving the puzzles that were set by it came first. However, it wasn’t model 
building, which had been done a long time before Pauling, but rather the faith Pauling put into 
his models and the experimental data respectively, which proved to be so influential on Crick 
and Watson: 
 
What Pauling did show us was that exact and careful model building could embody constraints that the final 
answer had in any case to satisfy. Sometimes this could lead to the correct structure, using only a minimum of the 
direct experimental [x-ray] evidence. This was the lesson that we learned and that Rosalind Franklin and 
Maurice Wilkins failed to appreciate in attempting to solve the structure of DNA. That, and the necessity for 
making no assumptions that could not be doubted from time to time. (Crick 1989, 60; italics added) 
 
In other words, in case it should turn out that the constraints of the model in form of bond 
angles and distances called for a structure that was incompatible with the x-ray data, the latter 
had to give way for the former. It was this attitude of Pauling’s towards the x-ray evidence – 
later to be adopted by Crick and Watson in their construction of the DNA structure – which 
Crick even believes to have made the difference between successful discovery and failure: 
 
The main difference of approach was that Jim [Watson] and I had an intimate knowledge of the way the α helix 
[of protein] was discovered [by Pauling, Corey and Branson (1951)]. We appreciated what a strong set of 
constraints the known interatomic distances and angles provided and how postulating that the structure was a 
regular helix reduced the number of free parameters drastically. The King’s workers were reluctant to be 
converted to such an approach. Rosalind [Franklin], in particular, wanted to use her experimental data as fully 
as possible. I think she thought that to guess the structure by trying various models, using a minimum of 
experimental facts, was too flashy. (Crick 1989, 68; my emphasis) 
 
In contrast to Franklin, who “wanted to use her data as fully as possible”, Crick and Watson, 
like Pauling, were prepared not to do so. Crick even promotes – rather shockingly to our usual 
intuitions about science I believe –ignorance of most of the experimental evidence: 
 
Thus, not only is the method of building scale models an extremely powerful one, since it embodies a large 
amount of data which any successful model must include, but for structures of this type it may well pay to build 
models without giving much attention to the experimental evidence. […] There is a case, in fact, for careful 
model building independent of most of the experimental data. (Crick 1954b, 217; my emphasis) 
 
Crick is not an exception. Wilkins, in his memoir, entertainingly concedes that  
 
Our main mistake was to pay too much attention to experimental evidence. Nelson won the battle of Copenhagen 
by putting his blind eye to the telescope so that he did not see the signal to stop fighting. In the same way, 
scientists sometimes should use the Nelson Principle and ignore experimental evidence. (Wilkins 2003, 166; my 
emphasis) 
 
What then is the reason why Crick, Watson and Wilkins, three Nobel Prize winners, promoted 
the ignorance of experimental evidence? The reason for this we shall find out in the next 
section.  
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1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF PROTEINS 
1.3.1 A FAILED INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 
Max Perutz was one of the first crystallographers to attempt the deciphering of 
macrostructures. Like Franklin later was to use the Patterson method in her search for the 
structure of DNA, Perutz used the Patterson method for investigating the structure of 
haemoglobin. Perutz reasoned that if “the [haemo]globin molecule consisted of a complex 
interlocking system of coiled 
polypeptide chains where 
interatomic vectors occur with 
equal frequency in all possible 
directions, the Patterson synthesis 
would be unlikely to provide a 
clue to the structure” (Perutz II, 
1949, 474; my emphasis). That is, 
if the haemoglobin molecule was 
a closely packed disordered 
system, the Patterson synthesis 
would be useless because it could 
not discern a structure. However, 
Perutz found that the Patterson 
contour maps of sections of the 
crystal exerted rod-like structures 
parallel to the crystallographic X-
axis (cf. Fig. 3). If one now 
produces a Patterson map normal to the x-axis one will get the pattern depicted to the far right 
of Fig. 3. One of these rod-like structures, being taken to represent the polypeptide chains of 
haemoglobin, is surrounded by six other rods and separated from them by 10.5A. The 
underlying structure inferred from the described 
Patterson maps is depicted in Fig. 4 where a central rod is 
surrounded by a hexagon whose corners are marked by 
rods. Perutz model of Fig. 4 seems indeed to be the most 
straightforward explanation for the data depicted in Fig. 
324. One can almost “see” the structure in the Patterson 
maps! And this is exactly the procedure Franklin pursued 
in trying to discover the structure of the DNA. She too 
sought to infer the structure from the Patterson map, the 
only direct available data on the structure of 
macromolecules. This line of reasoning from the data to 
the underlying reality of the phenomena is exactly what 
the proponents of IBE claim the scientist does and should do. And yet, this straightforward 
procedure from the data to the structure had its limitations, as we shall see soon.  
                                                 
24 However, it was not. Crick (1952a) showed that Perutz’ model of haemoglobin of long parallel chains 
couldn’t be correct. He calculated the Patterson peaks to be expected if such a structure as proposed by Perutz 
was assumed to be correct (cf. Judson 1996, 527p.). The correct structure of proteins was revealed by Pauling 
(see below).   
   
Fig. 3 Rod-like structures of high vector density in the Patterson maps 
of Haemoglobin. Map 2 exerts a shell-like structure at the origin 
marked S and an attached rod parallel to the x-axis with high vector 
peaks separated by 5.1 Å denoted by a. Map 9 shows a pair of rod-like 
structures (A-A). 
 
Fig. 4 Inferred underlying structure from the 
Patterson maps in Fig. 3, also known as the 
“hat-box” model. 
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1.3.2 THE MISLEADING 5.1 Ǻ SPOT IN PROTEINS AND HOW TO GET RID OF IT  
In Section 1.2 we were asking why Crick, Watson and Wilkins were promoting the ignorance 
of evidence. Crick, once again, gives us the necessary clue as to why he and Watson followed 
Pauling in applying the “Nelson principle”: 
 
You must remember, we were trying to solve [the structure of DNA] with the fewest possible assumptions. 
There’s a perfectly sound reason – it isn’t just a matter of aesthetics or because we thought it was a nice game – 
why you should use the minimum of experimental data. The fact is, you remember, that we knew that Bragg and 
Kendrew and Perutz had been misled by the experimental data. And therefore every bit of experimental evidence 
we had got at any one time we were prepared to throw away, because we said it may be misleading just the way 
that 5.1 reflection in alpha keratin was misleading. (Crick in Judson 1996, 93; altered emphasis) 
 
Before PCB discovered the α structure of polypeptides, Bragg, Kendrew and Perutz 
(henceforth BKP) at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, partly on the basis of the 
pioneering work by Perutz mentioned in Section 1.3.1., had their go at deciphering the 
structure. They published a paper in 1950 in which they reviewed and proposed possible 
structures of alpha keratin (ten in total)25. Basing their models on the data recorded by the 
authority in x-ray crystallography of fibres of that day, Bill Astbury at the University of 
Leeds, they made the 5.1 Ǻ repeat26 a condition the models had to satisfy. The 5.1 Å repeat 
was a consequence of the assumption that the helix had an integral symmetry axis. 
Crystallographically speaking there was no alternative to this assumption. Two-, three-, four-, 
or six-fold symmetries are the only possible symmetry axes because only with them can the 
pattern repeat indefinitely in two or three dimensions (cf. Crick and Kendrew 1957, 140)27. J. 
D. Bernal recalls that  
 
[w]e clung to the rules of crystallography, constancy of angles and so forth, the limitation of symmetry rotations 
to two-, three-, four-, and six-fold, which gave us the 230 space groups, as long as we could. Bragg hung on to 
them, and I’m not sure whether Perutz didn’t too, up to a point, and it needed Pauling to break them with his 
irrational [i.e. non-integral] helix. (Bernal 1966, 3; my emphasis; also quoted in Olby 1994, 289) 
 
BKP decided that a twofold fibre axis with three residues per turn, equivalent to the model 
that had been proposed by Astbury and Bell in 194128, would fit the Patterson synthesis best. 
In fact, BKP rejected a model very much akin to Pauling’s alpha helix because it did not 
satisfy the 5.1 Ǻ repeat condition (cf. Crick 1989, 58 and Olby 1994, 289).29 Pauling himself 
was first irritated by the 5.1 A spot. He describes his first attempt to unveil the structure of 
proteins thus: 
 
Although no direct experimental evidence was available about molecular dimensions of simple peptides or 
closely related substances, I thought the general structure theory should permit predictions to be made. I spent 
the summer of 1937 in an effort to find a way of coiling a polypeptide chain in three dimensions compatible with 
the x-ray data reported by Astbury. This effort was unsuccessful, which led me to conclude that I was making 
some unjustified assumption about the structural properties of the molecules. (Pauling in Judson 1996, 62; my 
emphasis) 
                                                 
25 Bragg, L., J. C. Kendrew, M. F. Perutz (1950), “Polypeptide Chain Configurations in Crystalline Proteins”, 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, vol. 203, no. 1074, 
pp. 321-357. 
26 The repeat of the molecule is the structural unit, which builds up the molecule by repeating itself. In this sense 
it is equivalent to the crystallographic unit cell.  
27 The n-fold screw axis of a structure is defined as the rotation of the structure through an angle of 360°/n about 
the axis and a simultaneous translation of the structure parallel to the axis.  
28 Astbury, W. T. and F. Bell (1941), “Nature of the Intramolecular Fold in α-Keratin and α-Myosin”, Nature, 
147, pp. 696-699. 
29 Apart from assuming the wrong repeat distance BKP also incorrectly allowed free rotation around the C-N 
bond in the polypeptide chain. 
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His failure to build a structure of proteins according to Astbury’s data (of 5.1 A in particular) 
made Pauling study the structure of the simpler components of proteins: amino acids and 
polypeptides. However eleven years of investigation revealed that “there wasn’t something 
important that we were overlooking […] and by 1948 it was evident that there were no 
surprises about these molecules, really. We had made our information more precise but hadn’t 
changed our understanding in any qualitative sense” (Pauling in Judson 1996, 64.). In 1948 
Pauling, lying in bed with a cold on his stay in Oxford as a visiting scholar, solved the 
problem by drawing on paper the chemical structure of a polypeptide chain including bond 
angles and lengths from memory and then folding the structure in space. Now, it is not the 
fact that Pauling used paper as a tool in discovering the structure, as some scholars would be 
happy to claim (see Klein 2001, and Klein 2003 and in particular Nye in Klein 2003). Rather, 
it was a purely theoretical idea, which was crucial to Pauling’s discovery: Given two identical 
and asymmetrical objects in space the general, mathematically provable, relation holding 
between these two objects is a rotation around and a translation along the axis between these 
objects. If this operation is repeated one arrives at a helical structure (cf. Pauling in Judson 
1996, 64)30. Pauling reports that this was the idea that he “had in 1948, and had not had in 
1937” (ibid.). For this idea to work, one had to treat the twenty amino-acid residues not as 
different but as equivalent: 
 
Back in 1937 I had been so impressed by the fact that the amino-acid residues in any position in the polypeptide 
chain may be of any of twenty different kinds that the idea that with respect to folding they might be nearly 
equivalent had not occurred to me. I accordingly thought to myself, what would be the consequences of the 
assumption that all of the amino-acid residues are structurally equivalent, with respect to the folding of the 
polypeptide chain? (Marinacci 1995, 124p.; my emphasis) 
 
On the basis of this theoretical idea Pauling gained confidence to ignore Astbury’s 5.1 Ǻ spot, 
which had caused him headaches before (see above). This allowed him to propose a helical 
structure with a non-integral axis of symmetry. Crick recollects that 
 
[Pauling] had not attempted to make the structure with an integer screw but had let the models fold naturally into 
any screw they were comfortable with. […] The fact that his model did not explain the 5.1 Å reflection on the 
meridian he put to one side. The irony was that Bragg, Kendrew and Perutz had built, among other models, one 
that was, in effect an α helix, but they had deformed the poor thing to make it have an exact fourfold axis. This 
made it look very forced, as indeed it was. (Crick 1989, 58; my emphasis) 
 
Again, Pauling, in contrast to BKP put stereochemical considerations – in the quote by Crick 
paraphrased in aesthetical terms – before the x-ray evidence. Instead of assuming a three- or 
fourfold axis of symmetry, accommodating the 5.1 Å reflection, as BKP did, PCB ignored 
Astbury’s spot and proposed 3.6 amino acids per repeat (i.e. a non-integral axis of symmetry 
corresponding to 100° rotation about the screw axis). This was the only model out of five 
possible ones which satisfied all the stereochemical constraints (cf. Pauling, Corey and 
                                                 
30 This argument can be found on the first paper by Pauling and Corey on the alpha helical structure of proteins: 
“An amino acid residue (other than glycine) has no symmetry elements. The general operation of conversion of 
one residue of a single chain into a second residue equivalent to the first is accordingly a rotation about an axis 
accompanied by translation along the axis. Hence the only configurations for a chain compatible with our 
postulate of equivalence of the residues are helical configurations”. (Pauling and Corey 1950, 206) The same 
idea, again, is described in Marinacci (1995, 125). My thanks belong to Greg Raddick for referring me to the last 
source. Huggins even earlier than Pauling made another theoretical argument for the helical structure of proteins: 
„Polypeptide chains extending through the crystalline regions must each have a screw axis of symmetry [i.e. a 
helical structure], or else two or more chains must be grouped around screw axes or other symmetry elements. 
The unbalanced forces on opposite sides of a chain which has no screw axis […] would tend to bend it 
continuously in the same direction.“ (Huggins 1942, 197) 
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Branson 1951, 208)31. From the number of the amino acid residues (and an inter-residue 
nitrogen-hydrogen-bond distance) followed that the helix had to have a repeat of 5.4 Å instead 
one of 5.1 Å and an inter-residue distance of 1.5 Å (= 5.4 Å / 3.6) (Pauling et al. 1951, 209). 
Encouragement for his model Pauling found in a study of synthetic proteins by Bamford, 
Hanby and Happey (1951), which had yielded the 5.4 A spot his model had predicted (cf. 
Olby 1994, 282p. and Judson 1996, 64pp). Very interestingly, this spot by Bamford et al. was 
interpreted to be within the limits of error of Astbury’s 5.1 A spot:  
 
The Courtauld’s scientists [i.e. Bamford et al.], however, shrugged off the difference between 5.26, 5.28, and 5.1 
A. much to Astbury’s annoyance […] Whereas Bamford, Hanby and Happey wanted to find a near 5.1 A repeat, 
Pauling and Corey did not want to. One picture in particular […] showed quite clearly that the so-called 
meridional arc at 5.26 A was in fact an off-meridional doublet, and they rightly put the true repeat distance at 
about 5 ½ A. (Olby 1996 282; original emphasis).  
 
Clearly, both Bamford et al. and Pauling were led by 
their respective presuppositions in interpreting the 
available evidence. Whereas Bamford et al. tried to 
assimilate their finding to the well-known and 
accepted 5.1A spot, Pauling interpreted the observed 
value in favour of his model32. And yet, Pauling was 
not content with this “confirmation” of the 5.4 A spot. 
Even though he left the 5.1 Å spot to one side when 
he built his model, a year later (1951), he found an 
explanation for why only a 5.1 Å spot could be 
observed but not the 5.4 Å spot, which followed from 
his model. If one presumed that the non-integral helix 
bends into a superhelix or coiled coil – like ropes laid 
together into a cable – the single helix due to its 
experienced deformation would turn into an integral 
helix and would thus produce the 5.4 Å spot33. In 
other words, Pauling’s model offered the resources 
for explaining away Astbury’s 5.1 A spot in the form of the supercoiling or coiled coil34. 
Although this might seem to be unsound scientific practice, this is exactly what happened 
without having been denounced by the scientific community.  
 In the last section we were asking how the noble price winners Crick, Watson and 
Wilkins could have possibly promoted the ignorance of evidence. In this section we saw why: 
Astbury’s 5.1A spot stood in the way of the “discovery” or rather postulation of the alpha 
structure of proteins. The Astbury spot was incompatible with helices. Only after Pauling was 
confident enough – due to his theoretical argument – to ignore this spot, was he in the position 
to propose his structure35.  
                                                 
31 This is the structure Pauling later coined “α helix”. There was another structure with 5.1 residues per turn, 
which also satisfied the constraints. Pauling coined it the γ helix. However Pauling later rejected this structure 
(Pauling and Corey 1951, 729; cf. Crick 1954, 200). 
32 This phenomenon, of course, is known as “theory-ladenness” of observations and has been a scorn to 
philosophers of science. Another most interesting example for theory-ladenness is discussed in Schindler (2007).  
33 Pauling and Corey (1953). Crick came up with the same idea almost simultaneously: Crick (1952b). 
According to Judson (1996, 129) Pauling’s paper arrived at Nature only one or two days after Crick’s.  
34 Although modern research has established irregularities in the coiling, the basic idea of coiled coils is still 
entirely accepted (cf. Gruber and Lupas 2003). 
35 There is admittedly another, sociological, dimension to Pauling’s discovery. Pauling, in contrast to BKP was 
not trained as a crystallographer and therefore found it much easier to reject one of the fundamental assumptions, 
crystallographers were working with at the time, namely the assumption that crystals always had to have an 
integral axis of symmetry (see the quote by Bernal above on page 12) This, once again, confirms Thomas S. 
 
Fig. 5 The coiled coil. Single helices 
(left) are packed together into 
superhelical cables and ropes (right). 
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1.3.3 DERIVED PREDICTIONS FROM PAULING’S ALPHA-HELIX OF PROTEIN MOLECULES 
After PCB had proposed their alpha helix with 3.6 residues per repeat of length 5.4 Å, Perutz 
realized that if this model were correct, a reflection at 1.5 Å had to be observed corresponding 
to the height between the amino-acid residues37. This reflection had not been observed before 
but Perutz realized that the photographs of protein taken by Astbury, on which PCB.’s model 
was based, could not record this reflection because the used apparatus precluded the 
observation of such a reflection. Therefore, instead of using a flat plate camera, as Astbury 
had done, Perutz employed a cylindrical film, which allowed for a Bragg angle of 31°, which 
was necessary for recording the 1.5 Å reflection (cf. Fig. 6; see Perutz 1951a, b and Perutz 
1998). Crick informs us that „this technique is almost as old as X-ray crystallography, but it 
was neglected in this field before the work of Perutz” (Crick, 
1954, 211). That is, PCB’s model led the way to an 
impressive novel prediction. We can put this more strongly: 
the PCB model seems to have been the precondition for 
modifying the experimental apparatus and for making the 
novel observation.  
Although the 1.5 Å reflection could be read off directly 
from the model, the general properties of the x-ray diffraction 
photographs, which were to be expected from an α-helix were 
unknown. “In response to the proposal by Pauling and 
Corey38”, and in order to establish a link between the whole 
model and the evidence, Cochran, Crick and Vand (1952) 
developed a theory of the effects of helices in x-ray 
diffraction patterns, which I shall introduce in the next 
section.  
2. THE CCV THEORY OF HELICAL X-RAY 
DIFFRACTION  
In x-ray diffraction of organic fibres like DNA the fibre axis is conventionally mounted along 
the vertical of the photographic film or plate. By rotating the fibre around the fibre axis whilst 
bombarding it with x-rays one obtains the whole reciprocal lattice39 on the same photograph 
(not just two dimensions as in a static photograph) because the lattice runs through different 
angles relative to the x-ray source thus satisfying all the Laue conditions, which are met 
whenever the path difference between the waves is an integral multiple of the wavelengths, 
resulting in positive interference. If the Laue conditions are not satisfied the waves cancel 
each other out (negative interference).  
                                                                                                                                                        
Kuhn’s dictum that new ideas are brought into a science by newcomers or outsiders. See Schindler (2007) for 
another impressive example in the realm of the plate tectonic revolution. 
36 Dr. John Lydon informed me that the picture in Perutz’s Nature paper was printed the wrong way around. The 
picture here appears in its correct orientation, which is why the letter b is tilted.  
37 This, in fact, was predicted by Pauling and Corey (1951, 243, “The structure of hair, muscle and related 
proteins”). However, from the (historical) literature it seems as though Perutz had realized this consequence by 
himself. Cf. Olby (1993, 234), Judson (1996, 69), Crick (1989, 59), Perutz (1998). 
38 “The structure of synthetic polypeptides“, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science U.S.A., 37, 241. 
39 That is, short distances on the photograph are actually large distances within the crystal lattice and vice versa. 
 
Fig. 6 Perutz’s recording 
of the 1.5 Å spot 
(marked by a reversed b 
at the top of the 
picture36). Due to the 
tilting of the specimen 
the reflection appears 
only on one side (here: 
the upper side) of the 
photograph. 
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In a rotation photograph the spots will be located on so-called layer 
lines perpendicular to the meridian, i.e. perpendicular to the fibre axis 
(cf. Fig. 7). The spots are located on these layer lines and are, due to 
the random orientation of the fibre’s components, sometimes drawn 
out into smudges and are fewer in number than in crystals. A 
reciprocal relationship between photograph and actual polymer 
obtains: the distance between the layer lines (i.e. along the meridian) 
on the photograph is inversely proportional to the repeat40 of the 
polymer along the fibre axis: a large distance between spots on the 
photograph corresponds to a small spacing between atoms in the 
fibre. Furthermore, the distances between the spots along the layer 
lines (along the equator) correspond to repeats at right angles to the 
fibre direction, i.e. to the fibre’s breadth41.  
The helical diffraction theory is a nice example of a 
“simultaneous discovery”. Vladimir Vand had tried to develop such 
theory when he saw Perutz note in Nature but his theory was flawed. 
At the same time Bragg, after having read the PCB. paper, had asked 
William Cochran to develop such a theory (cf. Judson 1996, 96). 
Simultaneously, Wilkins, after having read the PCB paper, was 
asking the theoretician in his lab, Alec Stokes, which x-ray diffraction consequences such a 
helical structure would entail42. Cochran, Crick and Vand (henceforth: CCV) first derived 
predictions for a continuous and then for a discontinuous helix. Their theory predicted 
 
that layer lines to which only high-order Bessel functions contribute would be weak or absent, and that those to 
which very low orders contribute would be strong. (Cochran et al. 1952) 
 
This amounted to meridional absences and a cross-ways pattern on the x-ray photographs. 
Fig. 8 depicts this pattern to be expected (right) from a helix (left).  
 
                                                 
40 Notice that the repeat in a fibre is a rather different thing from the repeating unit in a crystal (the unit cell). 
41 Good introductory readings are: Crick and Kendrew (1957), Matthews et al. (2000), Astbury Fundamentals of 
fibre structure, Cracknell (1969), Lipson (1970) and Holmes and Blow (1980). For an advanced resource see van 
Holde et al. (2006). 
42 “When I had finished reading Pauling’s α-helix paper I was puzzled that he seemed not to have a way of 
calculating X-ray diffraction from the structure” (Wilkins 2002, 160; also see Judson 1996, 95p.).  
 
Fig. 7 Rotation 
photograph. The specimen 
is mounted vertically. The 
spots fall onto the layer 
lines of the film marked by 
Li. 
 
Fig. 8 Schematic drawing of a helix (left) and CCV’s x-ray pattern prediction of such a helix 
(right). Notice the reciprocal relationship between the parameters of the helix (repeat, rise, 
pitch) and the predicted x-ray pattern. Also compare the prediction with the B form in Fig. 9. 
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Remember again that the observed pattern is reciprocal to the actual structure. The distance 
between the layer lines then corresponds to the repeat of the helix, the “height” of the cross 
corresponds to the rise of the helix (Fig. 8), and the angle between the arms of the cross 
deliver the parameter of the width of the helix. With the CCV theory the interpretation of the 
x-ray pictures became an unequivocal matter:  
 
Armed with the appropriate theory [i.e. CCV’s theory] it is often possible to recognize the helical nature of a 
fiber structure at a glance, and sometimes to specify the main parameters of the helix and its subunits with very 
little trouble indeed. (Crick and Kendrew 1957, 145; my emphasis) 
 
The CCV theory thus established the deductive link between the structure of the model and 
the x-ray diffraction data. Only through this link from the top-down the data gained the 
certainty and definiteness obvious from the quote above. As we shall see in the next section 
the CCV theory was going to play a crucial part in the discovery of the DNA structure. 
2.1 THE ROLE OF THE CCV THEORY IN THE DISCOVERY OF THE DNA STRUCTURE 
Although the CCV theory was developed in response to Pauling’s helical model for proteins, 
it of course applied to any sort of molecule with a helical structure. Cochran, one of the 
people, who hit on the CCV theory independently, supposes that  
 
The main value of this work [of the helical diffraction theory], seen in retrospect, is that it was the first step on 
the road to the discovery of the structure of DNA by Jim Watson and [Francis] Crick. (Cochran 1987, 16) 
 
In order to appreciate the value the CCV theory had for the discovery of DNA, we first of all 
need to consider briefly the x-ray diffraction pictures of crystallized DNA. 
   Fibres, built up of polymers (long molecule chains consisting of monomers) do not 
possess the order to be met in crystals. Whereas in crystals the molecules have a set 
orientation along the three crystallographic axes, in fibres the monomers are in random 
orientations. Some fibres are said to be crystalline because they consist of small regions which 
are perfectly crystalline, although this order is not consistent throughout the whole fibre but 
only local; each small crystalline region will have a different orientation from the others.  
In 1951 Franklin and Gosling observed that one had to apply a high degree of humidity in 
order to obtain a high degree of crystallinity in the DNA. When they tried to increase the 
crystallinity of the DNA by increasing the relative humidity above 75% a new x-ray pattern 
resulted. They dubbed the latter the “wet” or simply “B” form and the form at a relative 
humidity of 75% the “crystalline” or “A” form. Because the A form has crystalline order it 
produces sharp spots, whereas the B form – due to the random orientations of its molecules – 
produces smears (Fig. 9)43.  
                                                 
43 Before Franklin had established the two pure forms, it was assumed that there was only one form. In 1938 
Astbury and Bell had obtained the first x-ray diffraction picture of DNA with a marked 3.4 Å spot but the layer 
lines were not separated by 34 Å (a feature of the B pattern) but by roughly 27 Å (a feature of the A pattern). The 
repeat distances were much clearer for the B than for the A form. Since the A form in regard to the B form is 
shrunk by 25% the interesidual distance had to be 2.8A. In the B form the distance between the layer lines was 
34 A and thus had to be 28 A for the A form.  
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Fig. 9 X-ray photographs of the A (“crystalline”) and the B (“wet”) form of DNA (see Franklin and Gosling 
1953a, Fig.1 and Fig. 4). Whereas the A form contains sharp spots the B form has a cross of smudges. Both 
forms display meridional absences of reflections and strong black arcs on the top and the bottom of the 
photograph (A: 2.8 Å, B: 3.4 Å).  
Because the A form was crystallographically more telling in that it contained sharper spots 
due to a more ordered underlying structure, Franklin preferred the A form over the B form: 
 
Franklin had decided that there were sufficient discrete reflexions in the diffraction pattern of the A form to 
settle the question of the existence of helices of this form by an objective crystallographic analysis, without any 
assumptions having to be made. (Klug 1968, in Watson 1980, 154; my emphasis)44  
 
On the other hand, Crick and Watson were concentrating on the B-form, because it was a 
straightforward confirmation of the X-shaped pattern predicted by the CCV theory. And this 
is the exactly the reason for Watson’s astonishment, when Wilkins showed him the B-form of 
DNA, which Franklin had produced (compare the predicted X shaped pattern in Fig. 8 and the 
B form in Fig. 9): 
 
The instant I saw the picture my mouth fell open and my pulse began to race. The pattern was unbelievably 
simpler than those obtained previously (“A” form). Moreover, the black cross of reflections which dominated the 
picture could arise only from a helical structure. With the A form, the argument for a helix was never straight-
forward, and considerable ambiguity existed as to exactly which type of helical symmetry was present. With the 
B form, however, mere inspection of its X-ray picture gave several of the vital helical parameters. (Watson 1980, 
98; my emphasis) 
 
Again, we here have a very strong form of theory-ladenness (cf. page 14). Without the CCV 
theory, the B-pattern to Watson would have been meaningless. Even more so, the B pattern 
gained an unambiguousness it would have not possessed without the theory. Asked by the 
historian Judson, whether Watson knew any of the calculations Franklin had done on the B-
pattern, Watson denied and declared that merely “seeing” the photograph had been enough for 
him to construct the model of the DNA: 
 
I had a clear memory of it, which could help me with the model because the way the arms of the cross lay in the 
diagram showed where the main mass of the helix [phosphate groups] had to be […] If you saw – that’s about it. 
(Watson in Judson 1996, 137; my emphasis) 
 
                                                 
44 See also Klug (2004, 20p.), Maddox (2002, 170) and Judson (1996, 114). 
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The reverse is also true. One year before CCV had 
developed their x-ray diffraction theory and two years 
before Franklin discovered the B pattern, Astbury had 
put his student Beighton 1951 onto thymus DNA, who 
managed to produce a very pure form of this very B-
pattern (cf. Fig. 10). Yet, Astbury and Beighton rejected 
the photograph because they thought it was a mix: 
 
Strangely enough, Astbury was disappointed by these results and 
both Beighton and he obviously thought that the 1938-39 Bell 
pictures represented pure forms, whereas Beigton's B form was a 
mixture - with few X-ray spots of course! (Olby 1994, 379; my 
italics)46 
 
Clearly then, Astbury and Beighton did not understand 
what they were seeing because they did not possess the theory, which would have told them 
unequivocally that the B-pattern was the purest and clearest one could get.47 Equipped with 
the same theory as Watson, Wilkins and Stokes, too, realized that Stokes calculations fit 
Franklin’s B pattern very well. When they mentioned this to Franklin she responded angrily 
“how dare you interpret my results!” (Wilkins 2003, 161) And yet, also Franklin could not 
escape the conclusion that the consequences derived from a helix by CCV fit fantastically 
well with her B-pattern and thus made the helical structure for this pattern undebatable48.  
3. KILLING THE HELIX 
And yet, rather awkwardly, Franklin wrote, in the same year she had produced this B-form 
(1952)49, a death note for the helix for the A form which read: 
 
                                                 
45 This is a copy of Olby’s reproduction of Beighton’s original photograph (Olby 1994, plate 17). Olby informed 
me that the photograph was lost by his publisher MacMillan. Crick, in his foreword to Olby’s The Path, 
mentions this picture due to Olby’s research to have been a “complete surprise even to those who were actively 
working in the field” (Olby 1972, vi) 
46 I asked Robert Olby where he received this information from. He wasn’t so sure – after all he wrote The Path 
more than 30 years ago – but in his memory he had talked to Preston and Rudall.  
47 Olby (1972, 436) supports this conclusion. 
48 Dr. John Lydon informs me that the match between theoretical predictions and the observed pattern was only 
accurate for the geometrical pattern, i.e. for the positions of the reflections. In fact, the predictions and the 
observed pattern disclosed a mismatch of 90 %! Normally, the R(eliablility)-factor crystallographers are working 
with allows for a mismatch of 20-30 %. Still, scientists accepted the double helix because “it was so beautiful it 
just had to be right!” (my own wordings of a statement by John Lydon; personal communication). Richard 
Dickerson supports this statement by saying that “[t]he α helix was accepted, not because it fitted Patterson maps 
or any other x-ray data, but because it looked right” (Dickerson 2005, 61; my emphasis). Due to Wilkins work in 
the aftermath of Crick and Watson’s proposed model the mismatch could be reduced significantly. According to 
Klug (2004, 24p.) this process took seven years. But the final “formal crystallographic proof of the double helix 
and the base pairing did not come until 1979, when Drew and Dickerson [1981] solved the structure of a 
dodecameric DNA oligonucleotide of defined sequence, by using the totally objective heavy atom method.” 
Crick concurs by saying that “The double helical structure of DNA was thus finally confirmed only in the early 
1980s. It took over twenty-five years for our model of DNA to go from being only rather plausible, to being very 
plausible (as a result of the detailed work on DNA fibers), and from there to being virtually certainly correct. 
Even then it was correct only in outline, not in precise detail […] The establishment of the double helix could 
serve as a useful case history, showing one example of the complicated way theories become “fact””. (Crick 
1989, 74; original emphasis; see also footnote 48 of this paper).  
49 This was the picture Franklin later was to reproduce in her Nature article alongside Crick and Watson’s 
groundbreaking announcement of the double helix.  
 
Fig. 10  Beighton’s B form 
pattern45. Compare with pattern 
B in Fig. 9 
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It is with great regret that we have to announce the death, on Friday 18th July, 1952, of D.N.A. helix (crystalline). 
Death followed a protracted illness which an intensive course of Bessel injections had failed to relieve50. A 
memorial service will be held next Monday or Tuesday. It is hoped that Dr. M.H.R. Wilkins will speak in 
memory of the late helix. (Franklin and Gosling 1952, quoted in Wilkins 2003, 182) 
 
The reason for this death note of the helix for the crystalline A form was one of Franklin’s 
shots of this form, which displayed “double orientation”, i.e. “the crystallites were not in 
random orientation about the fibre axis” and the pattern showed clear differences in the 
intensities of the reflexions on the two sides of the axis (Franklin and Gosling 1953b; see also 
Olby 1974, 370p.). This was irreconcilable with a helical structure, as Wilkins conceded later:  
 
Stokes and I could see no way round the conclusion that Rosalind had reached after months of careful work. It 
seemed, in spite of all previous indications, that the DNA molecule was lop-sided and not helical. (Wilkins 2003, 
182) 
 
Judson (1996, 112) informs us that “[p]icture and fibre were unique, fortuitous, impossible to 
duplicate despite many attempts. Franklin came to set great store by this picture”, which she 
described as being “due either to a mechanical accident to the fibre or to preferential 
orientation of the crystallites which lie near the surface” (Franklin and Gosling 1953b, 683) 
but concluded that “it seems unlikely that [double orientation] could have occurred at all if the 
individual crystallites had a high degree of symmetry about the fibre axis” (ibid., 684), i.e. 
Franklin was positive and was able to convince Wilkins and Stokes that asymmetry in the 
form of the double orientation was not an accident but an original feature of the structure. 
When Watson saw Franklin’s “antihelical” evidence, he “decided to take a full 
explosion” on Franklin because Crick had assured him that Franklin’s antihelical results were 
“a red herring”:  
 
Without further hesitation I implied that she was incompetent in interpreting X-ray pictures. If only she would 
learn some theory, she would understand how her supposed antihelical features arose from the minor distortions 
to pack regular helices into a crystalline lattice. (Watson 1968, 96; my emphasis) 
 
Obviously, it was again theory (in this case the theory of the coiled coil), which gave Crick 
and Watson the confidence that Franklin’s results could not possibly be a threat to their 
assumption that the DNA was helical. According to Crick the asymmetry Franklin had found 
in one of her A patterns could be explained away by a small and unusual asymmetry in the 
parallel packing of the helical molecules in the specimen (Judson 1996, 118 and Olby 1996, 
370). Crick described his and Watson’s general attitude towards Franklin’s evidence thus: 
 
When she told us DNA couldn’t be a helix, we said, ‘Nonsense’. And when she said but her measurements 
showed that it couldn’t, we said, ‘Well, they’re wrong’. You see, that was our sort of attitude. (Crick in Judson 
1996, 118) 
 
Crick and Watson’s dismissive attitude was justified on grounds of their model and the CCV 
theory, which established the link between model and evidence. Model-building and theory 
construction provided the backdrop against which evidence was to be assessed and 
categorized into “good” or “bad”. Franklin lacked these resources from the “top-down” and 
thus was almost doomed to fail in unveiling the structure of the DNA. 
3.1 APPRECIATING ALL EVIDENCE – IN VAIN 
Franklin’s attitude towards the structure of the DNA before Crick and Watson’s discovery has 
been described – most notably by Watson in his Double Helix – as being ideologically 
                                                 
50 Obviously, with “Bessel injections” Franklin was referring to the CCV theory.    
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“antihelical”51. However, Franklin’s collaborator of her later years Aaron Klug (1968) has 
done away with this simplification.  
 
[Her attitude] might be more accurately described as one of questioning; the question being whether the structure 
of B – undoubtedly helical in her view – also applied to the crystalline structure A. (footnote in Klug 1968 in 
Watson 1980, 154)  
 
As mentioned above, Franklin “set great store” by her anthelical A form photograph. 
Although Franklin according to Klug and also Gosling52 did not doubt that the B-pattern 
indicated an α-helix, she tried to find other structures, which were compatible with her 
antihelical A form. As Crick pointed out, Franklin “wanted to use her experimental data as 
fully as possible” (Crick 1989, 68) and so she attempted to find a structure that would fit all 
the data available. Franklin unsuccessfully considered a “figure of 8 structure” (Judson 1996, 
132), “bananas” and “double sheets” (ibid., 128). Klug summarizes Franklin’s premises thus: 
 
[A]lthough there were clearly helices present in the B structure, these might be so distorted, or even undone, by 
the intermolecular bonds in the crystalline A structure that she had to consider non-helical structures. (Klug 
1968, in Watson 1968, 155)53  
 
Franklin herself said that  
 
the helix in the wet state is therefore presumably not identical with that of the crystalline state (Franklin in her 
annual report; Judson 1996, 111) 
 
Because Franklin did not want to commit to any particular hypothesis before she wasn’t 
compelled by the evidence to do so and had therefore to take seriously every single piece of 
evidence. This led to some sort of “deadlock”, which did not allow her to form a coherent 
hypothesis of the structure of DNA. Watson, in Crick’s wordings, puts this point thus: 
 
Jim [Watson] was little more brash [sic], stating that no good model ever accounted for all the facts, since some 
data was bound to be misleading if not plain wrong. A theory that did fit all the data would have been 
“carpentered” to do this and would thus be open to suspicion. (Crick 1989, 59p.; original emphasis) 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I tried to make available to philosophical discussions one of the most exciting 
and historically most well investigated episodes in the history of science. This was done by 
discussing the historical material against the backdrop of the currently “received view” of 
scientific models and their relation to the theory and the phenomena. This received view has 
the model as some sort of “simplification”, “distortion”, or “idealization” of the real system 
and locates it between theory and the world allowing the application of the former to the 
latter. Both of these assumptions cannot be confirmed with the present case.  
Contrary to the received view, it was not the model (as a sort of hypothesis about the 
structure of the DNA at the model’s core), which mediated between theory and world, but 
rather the theory developed by Cochran, Crick and Vand, which fulfilled the mediating role 
between model and the x-ray diffraction photographs. However, calling the theory’s role 
merely a mediating one would not do justice to the case. The theory’s role has to be 
articulated in much stronger terms: the theory established the deductive link between the 
model and the data. Only through the theory were the data endowed with a meaning, which 
                                                 
51 See also Hamilton (1968). 
52 Klug (2004), Gosling in Maddox (2002), Judson (1996). 
53 She was thinking of the A form as an unwound version of the helices in the B state (rather, I imagine, like the 
β-sheet structure is to the α-helix in proteins and polypeptides) (see Klug 2004, 25). 
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could be read off the x-ray photographs at a glance. Interestingly, the evidence gained a 
certainty it did not possess prior to the deductions from the model through the CCV theory54. 
This was impressively evidenced by the fact that Astbury and Beighton could not appreciate 
the value of the very clear B pattern they had obtained long before Franklin.   
In regard to how the nature of models is standardly construed, as pointed out in the 
introduction already, it is hard to see in what sense Crick and Watson’s model is to be 
considered a simplification or idealization of the real structure of DNA. Before Crick and 
Watson nobody knew how the real structure looked like so there was no way of idealizing the 
real structure. Rather, Crick and Watson postulated the structure, as they themselves declared 
in their seminal paper (Crick and Watson 1953, 737)55. Crick and Watson did not infer the 
structure from the evidence. Yet, exactly this is what Rosalind Franklin tried to do. She 
committed herself to an approach very much akin to what Cartwright et al. think is the typical 
approach in model-building and what the proponents of the Inference to the Explanation hold 
to be good scientific practice56. Rather than postulating a structure, Franklin started from the 
only direct evidence on the DNA structure available and used the mathematical technique of 
the Patterson synthesis in an attempt to infer the (model of the) DNA structure from those x-
ray photographs. She explored many different hypotheses that would account for both the A 
and the B pattern of x-ray photographs. However, she was not able to infer the best 
explanation due to the fact that she, in consultation with her colleagues Wilkins and Stokes, 
had ruled out a helical structure for the A pattern and thus saw herself confronted with the 
apparent need to find another hypothesis for the A pattern, which was going to be different 
from the structure of the B pattern. This situation Watson described as a deadlock (see last 
section). In contrast to Franklin, Crick and Watson chose a procedure from the “top-down”. 
Probably based on the theoretical argument for helical structures in proteins by Pauling (see 
Section 1.3.2), Crick and Watson assumed a helical structure throughout without ever 
doubting this assumption57. The crucial difference, then, between Franklin’s and Crick & 
Watson’s approach, which Crick even explicates himself (see page 10), was their respective 
attitudes towards the evidence. Whereas Franklin tried to “use her data as fully as possible”, 
and on the basis of the data attempted to infer the DNA structure, Crick and Watson, in 
contrast were very cautious in regard to the validity of the evidence and were led mainly by 
theoretical considerations and theoretically plausible arguments. Franklin’s and Crick & 
Watson’s respective attitudes are a consequence of their respective approaches: whereas 
Franklin, due to her “bottom-up” approach, had no grounds for rejecting any piece of 
evidence as being “bad” but had to consider every piece of evidence she could get hold of, 
Crick and Watson, again due to their “top-down” approach, were happy to neglect any piece 
of evidence at any time, in case that piece of evidence would not fit with their commitment to 
the helical structure. Although this at first glance surely seems to be a rather irrational 
behaviour, in face of the history, it seems to be the more reasonable one. In fact, we observed 
in this essay that taking particular evidence too seriously blocked some researchers from 
making discoveries, which were made by others, which ignored the same evidence. This is not 
                                                 
54 See Schindler (forthcoming) for a discussion of this phenomenon on a broader scale. 
55 The postulation of “imaginary entities” seems to be a rather common characteristic of scientific models, 
although philosophers of science have missed this point entirely hitherto. See Schindler (2006) for details. 
56 In the introduction I have pointed out that Cartwright is committed to some form of discovery procedure 
“from the bottom-up”. I have ruled out induction as an appropriate candidate, which leaves only IBE. 
57 In Olby (1994) one can read a quote by Crick, where he says that the helical confirmation „was very much in 
the air just before the alpha helix [of proteins] […] Pauling obviously thought that way; Bragg was convinced 
things were helical. They were all building helical models. I would say, you would be eccentric, looking back, if 
you didn’t think DNA was helical“. (Crick 1968 in Olby 1994, 294). The critical reader, however, should ask as 
to why helices were so „fashionable“ (Olby 1994 and any other piece of literature I have read on the discovery of 
the DNA fails to do so!). The reason, as I firmly believe has to be sought in Huggins’s and Pauling’s theoretical 
arguments in favour of helices (see page 13). 
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only true for Franklin, who took too seriously her odd A pattern, which indicated a structure 
for the DNA different from a helix, but also for Bragg, Kendrew and Perutz, who took too 
seriously Astbury’s 5.1A spot, which lead them to rule out the correct alpha structure for 
proteins (see Section 1.3.2)58. Thus, given all the evidence considered in this essay, one could 
conclude that the DNA structure was discovered from the “top-down”.  
5. EPILOGUE: CHARGAFF’S RATIOS 
In many textbooks of biochemistry and historical accounts the base ratios of 1:1 between the 
number of adenine (A) and thymine (T) molecules and between the number of guanine (G) 
and cytosine (C) molecules, discovered by Erwin Chargaff, are introduced as being the crucial 
information Crick and Watson built their model upon. If you know, how the bases fit together 
– so the reasoning goes – you know how the double helix must be built. Because some readers 
might raise this as an objection against the conclusions drawn in this paper, it is necessary to 
set straight this prejudice about the role the Chargaff ratios really played in the discovery of 
the DNA structure. First of all it should be noted that Crick and Watson tried to build models 
with the bases outside the sugar and phosphor strands due to the complexity resulting in 
having the bases between the chains being too high (see Watson 1980, 103). However, when 
this did not lead to the desired success, Watson, at some point of despair, decided to put the 
bases inside the sugar and phosphor strands. But even then, Chargaff’s ratios did not play any 
part whatsoever, as should be more than plain from the following quotes: 
 
The data of Chargaff’s, you know, wasn’t all that convincing unless you wanted to believe it. (Crick in Judson 
1996, 154) [W]hen we came to build the structure we did not initially use that idea [of 1:1 ratios]. We didn’t do 
it until we were driven towards it. [W]e never knew whether Chargaff’s rules had some completely extraneous 
functional reason, and so we didn’t put that in[to the model]. The Chargaff rations just fell out at the end. 
(Watson in Judson 1996, 148; original emphasis) Chargaff’s rules then suddenly stood out as a consequence of a 
double-helical structure of DNA. (Watson 1980, 114) When the final model of DNA was discovered – more or 
less by accident – it wasn’t Chargaff’s rules that made the model, but the model that made the rules. (Donohue 
1978, 135; my italics; see also Judson 1996, 637) 
 
Rather than being a piece of information that went into the construction of the model, the 1:1 
base ratios were a consequence of the model: they are explained by the A-T and G-C base 
pairing59. The corresponding base pairings in the structure, in turn, were “forced onto” Crick 
and Watson not by the experimental finding by Chargaff, but rather by the fact that the strands 
had to run antiparallelly, which again was a consequence of Franklin’s finding that the 
crystallographic unit of the A-pattern of DNA was C2-symmetrical60. But even if one were 
                                                 
58 See also Section 4.1 where Astbury rejected a helical structure for proteins for reasons to do with density 
measurements. It so happens that similar observations can be made in other sciences too. Einstein, for instance, 
neglected the positive results of an ether drift experiment carried out by Miller in 1920s, which “caused a major 
upheaval in the scientific community” and many to reject Einstein’s theory of relativity (Hentschel 1992, 604). 
Another neat example is the controversy between Millikan and Ehrenhaft about whether there were smaller parts 
charges than the ones measured for electrons by Millikan. Holton (1978) has shown that Millikan disregarded a 
large amount of the oil drops he gained in his experiments for no apparent reason. Ehrenhaft discounted 
Millikan’s “style” that “piles up ‘hypotheses and corrections’”. His “style”, in contrast, was to “proceed from the 
direct facts” and to admit all measurements in his analysis (see ibid, 73, 78 and 79 in particular).     
59 Before Crick and Watson’s model Chargaff’s ratios were unexplained. They seem to have a similar 
epistemological status like Boyle’s or Kepler’s law before they were explained by the kinetic theory of gases and 
Newton’s theory of gravitation respectively. 
60 This, Franklin herself and everybody else who was aware of the contents of her report to the Medical 
Research Council (Perutz, Wilkins and Stokes) for some strange reason failed to realize (cf. Judson 1996, 142). 
For the implications of the C2 or “face-centred” symmetry group see Perutz’s explications in Judson (1996, 
102). The fact that the DNA structure belongs to the C2 symmetry group was contained in Franklin’s MRC 
report, which Perutz passed on to Crick and Watson. Although this action has caused some controversy as to 
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still to believe that Chargaff’s ratio did play a part in the discovery of the structure of DNA, 
Crick and Watson’s presupposition that the structure was helical, which was the focus of this 
paper, is not affected61.  
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